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Construction by Description in Discourse
Representation∗
Noor van Leusen and Reinhard Muskens
Abstract
This paper uses classical logic for a simultaneous description of the syn-
tax and semantics of a fragment of English and it is argued that such
an approach to natural language allows procedural aspects of linguistic
theory to get a purely declarative formulation. In particular, it will be
shown how certain construction rules in Discourse Representation The-
ory, such as the rule that indefinites create new discourse referents and
definites pick up an existing referent, can be formulated declaratively if
logic is used as a metalanguage for English. In this case the declarative
aspects of a rule are highlighted when we focus on the model theory of the
description language while a procedural perspective is obtained when its
proof theory is concentrated on. Themes of interest are Discourse Rep-
resentation Theory, resolution of anaphora, resolution of presuppositions,
and underspecification.
1 Introduction
In this paper we want to argue that important parts of the Discourse Represen-
tation Theory construction algorithm (Kamp, 1981; Kamp and Reyle, 1993),
which is highly procedural, can in fact be given a purely declarative, logical
formulation. In particular, procedural rules such as ‘introduce a new discourse
referent into the universe of the Discourse Representation Structure,’ or ‘iden-
tify discourse referent u with an accessible referent’ have natural declarative
formulations within the ‘Logical Description Grammars’ of (Muskens, 2001),
an approach that uses logic for simultaneous description of syntax and seman-
tics. Presuppositions can also be accounted for within such a logical set-up
and we implement a rudimentary presupposition mechanism, which allows the
‘binding’ of presuppositions (van der Sandt, 1989; van der Sandt, 1992) and a
form of global (but no intermediate or local) accommodation. Earlier logical
approaches to discourse semantics typically could not account for procedural as-
pects of the construction algorithm. For example, in Dynamic Predicate Logic
(Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1991) and related formalisms (including (Muskens,
∗From: Jaroslav Peregrin (ed.), Meaning: The Dynamic Turn, Elsevier, 2003, pp. 33–65.
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1996)) it is necessary to assume that syntactic input to the semantic compo-
nent comes pre-indexed, with co-indexation between antecedents and dependent
elements representing anaphoric linking.
The question of declarativity versus procedurality is related to the question
which roles the main branches of logic can play in linguistic theory. There is a
natural tendency to associate linguistic semantics with model theory and linguis-
tic syntax with proof theory. Montague’s work is a prime example of the first
association, while the connection between natural language syntax and proof
theory is apparent from the widespread use of context free grammars in syntac-
tic theory, from the derivations in early transformational approaches, and, even
more explicitly, from Lambek’s categorical calculi (Lambek, 1958; Moortgat,
1997). However, it is also fruitful to make cross-combinations. This becomes
apparent, for example, when we turn to the ‘model-theoretic syntax’ of (Black-
burn, 1993; Blackburn, Gardent and Meyer-Viol, 1993; Rogers, 1996; Blackburn
and Meyer-Viol, 1996) and others. Model-theoretic syntax studies the model
theory of syntactic structures such as trees and feature structures. In a simi-
lar spirit (Kurtonina, 1995) defines various forms of Kripke semantics for the
language of Lambek categorial grammar, and works out the model theory and
correspondence theory of such systems, thus also giving a model-theoretic twist
to an enterprise whose main focus is on natural language syntax. Conversely,
proof-theoretic approaches to natural language semantics also abound. Some
accounts are purely proof-theoretic, such as the approach of (Ranta, 1994),
which is based on Martin-Löf’s intuitionistic type theory. Other applications of
proof theory to linguistic semantics seek to supplement existing model-theoretic
accounts. As an example of the latter the type-shifting proposals (Partee and
Rooth, 1983) and (Hendriks, 1988) can be mentioned. These proposals have
a definitely proof-theoretic flavour and are related to the (undirected) Lambek
Calculus.
Once we are confronted with such obviously fruitful crossings of the border,
any idea we might have had of an exclusive alignment of natural language syn-
tax with proof theory and a similar alignment of model theory with linguistic
semantics is thrown into doubt.1 There are procedural aspects of meaning and
declarative aspects of form. The most natural way to deal with the former is
by using proofs and the latter are best dealt with using models. In fact, what
we want to emphasize here is the duality of such declarative and procedural
aspects. We take the perspective of (Muskens, 2001) and will essentially use
logic (classical type logic) as a metalanguage for the description of natural lan-
guage (here: a fragment of English). This introduces an orthogonality between,
on the one hand, the proof theory and model theory of the describing logic,
and, on the other, the syntax and semantics of the fragment described. Our
aim is to develop a combined logic of form and meaning; when focussing on its
proof theory we get its procedural aspects, if its model theory is focused on,
its declarative aspects are highlighted. This, of course, is the normal duality of
1On the connections between natural language semantics, model theory, and proof theory,
see also (Peregrin, 1997).
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Table 1: Variables used in this paper will have types as indicated.
proof and structure in logic.
A Logical Description Grammar (LDG) will be a logical theory G, set up
with the intention that whenever we have a logical sentence IT stating some
simple properties of a text T , the combined theory G + IT describes the syntax
and semantics of T . We will assume here that the models of G + IT contain
trees decorated with semantic values; a function (or, in fact, family of functions)
σ will associate values with tree nodes. The logic talks about natural language
semantics and natural language syntax. In its models we get semantically anno-
tated trees (this in addition to the usual objects and relations) and in its proof
theory we can reason about these.
As was argued extensively in (Muskens, 2001), underspecification naturally
falls out of this view. Since a description G+IT can have more than one model,
the syntax and semantics of T may remain underspecified. In particular, it can
be shown that, with the right set-up, certain stages in the reasoning process that
takes G+IT as its point of departure are closely analogous to the Underspecified
Discourse Representation Structures (UDRSs) of (Reyle, 1993). There is no need
to postulate a separate structural level of the latter, we get UDRSs for free if
the hearer’s simultaneous reasoning about the syntax and semantics of an input
expression is modeled. We conclude that the description view on Discourse
Representation explains why UDRSs emerge. No stipulation of such structures
is necessary.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In the next section we start
with defining and explaining the ‘Logical Description Grammars’ of (Muskens,
2001); it will be discussed how input descriptions IT are obtained and an axiom-
atization of some syntactic and semantic concepts is given. Section 3 interrupts
the definition of LDGs and consists of a treatment of Discourse Representa-
tion Structures (DRSs) within type logic that, although it is related to that
of (Muskens, 1996), offers a notion of DRSs more fine-grained than the one
developed there. Section 4 continues setting up the LDG theory, providing a
lexicon and a worked example of a hearer’s reasoning. Section 5 explains how
some of the details of the Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) machinery
obtain a declarative treatment. It is shown how presuppositions can be bound
or accommodated, how discourse referents are resolved, how discourse referents
connected with proper names land up in the main DRS and how underspeci-
fied DRSs can be identified with certain descriptions. The paper ends with a
conclusion and an appendix gives a small grammar fragment.
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Constants Type
r, 0, 1, . . . ν
>, pedro, has, . . . νt
lex νt
pn, cn, tv, . . . νt
dp, vp, d, . . . l
` νl
α+, α− νν
u, o, w νπ
σβ νβ
Constants Type
≺, + (ν × ν)t
V (π × s)t
E (e× e)t
W et
Pedro, sleeps, . . . (e× e)t
loves, has, . . . (e× e× e)t
B τ
Γ ντ
Table 2: Some constants used in this paper and their associated types. Here β
varies over types and τ is an abbreviation of πt× (st×πt)t (the type of DRSs).
2 LDG: Input Descriptions and Axioms
In this section and in section 4 we will give an overview of the Logical Descrip-
tion Grammars (LDGs) developed in (Muskens, 1995; Muskens, 1999; Muskens,
2001).2 We describe a system that is closely related to the one given in the
last of these papers, but make some choices of design that slightly deviate from
those that were made there. For more details and motivation the reader is
nevertheless referred to (Muskens, 2001).
We work in classical type logic with ground types e (entities), ν (tree nodes),
l (tree labels), π (registers), and s (states). Since we will have occasion to use
many variables and constants in these types and in complex types composed out
of these primitive ones, it will be convenient to have typographical conventions
of the form: ‘whenever v is used, it will be a variable of type π.’ Table 1 gives
an overview of such typographical conventions used for variables and Table 2
gives a similar overview for constants.
It will be expedient to have pairing and projection in the logic. We will
assume that whenever A is a term of type α and B a term of type β, 〈A, B〉
is a term of type α × β. Also, whenever A is a term of type α × β, fst(A) will
be a term of type α (denoting the first element of the denotation of A) and
snd(A) a term of type β (denoting the second element). These terms will have
the obvious semantics.
2.1 Input Descriptions
Descriptions in our approach will consist of two parts. The first part will be a
grammar G consisting of certain axioms and a lexicon. This part is not supposed
2As far as we are aware (Muskens, 1995), presented at the Prague session of the Prague-
Teinach Workshop in February 1995, was the first paper to extend the syntactic Description
Theory of (Marcus, Hindle and Fleck, 1983; Vijay-Shankar, 1992; Rambow, Vijay-Shanker
and Weir, 1995) to semantics. The paper also gave a solution to the question (crucial, but
often overlooked) of how semantic binding should be dealt with in underspecified semantics.
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to vary and models a hearer’s grammatical knowledge. The second part will be
the description IT of an observed text T . This input description can be obtained
in the following way. Suppose that the text that is to be described starts with
(1).
(1) Pedro has a mule
Discourse participants reason about the trees that are possibly connected with a
given discourse. The input description only concerns the lexical elements of such
trees. We shall assume that lexical elements can be words or discourse relations,3
including a special unary discourse relation signifying that the discourse has
started. Upon hearing (1) a discourse participant can draw certain conclusions.
First, she may conclude that the discourse has indeed started and that the
start element, which she may give a name, say 0, must therefore be present.
She draws the conclusion in (2a). Here ‘>’ stands for the predicate ‘is the
start element’ and ≺ denotes precedence in trees. Secondly, there is a lexical
element ‘Pedro’, which came just after the start. So the tree must have a lexical
node labeled ‘Pedro’. Our hearer gives it an arbitrary node name, say 1, and
concludes (2b), in which ≺1 is immediate precedence (i.e. n ≺1 n
′ abbreviates
n ≺ n′ ∧ ¬∃k[n ≺ k ∧ k ≺ n′]).
(2) a. >(0) ∧ ¬∃k k ≺ 0
b. pedro(1) ∧ 0 ≺1 1
c. has(2) ∧ 1 ≺1 2
d. a(3) ∧ 2 ≺1 3
e. mule(4) ∧ 3 ≺1 4
In a similar fashion the hearer adds (2c)–(2e) to her stock of beliefs, after which
she may perhaps hypothesize that the end of the discourse has been reached
already, hypothetically adding (3). (Addition of such an ‘end’ statement will
make interpretation of the text heard sofar possible, as we will see below.)
(3) ¬∃k 4 ≺ k
Of course, the discourse may in fact continue, say with (4).
(4) He feeds it
3We are simplifying matters considerably here. In a fully fledged discourse model, we would
distinguish between discourse connectives, such as ‘and’, ‘but’, ‘because’ and ‘either . . . or’,
and the discourse relations which they denote or partly specify, such as sequencing, contrast,
cause, and disjunction. The lexicon of the grammar would contain discourse connectives
rather than discourse relations. In order to account for texts in which a discourse relation
is not explicitly specified through a discourse connective, the grammar can be assumed to
allow for ‘implicit’ or nonlexical anchors of discourse relations, as in e.g. (van Leusen, 2003).
Alternatively, punctuation may be taken to function as lexical anchor for implicit discourse
relations, as in e.g. (Webber, Knott and Joshi, 2001).
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Assuming that our hearer recognizes that this is a new sentence and not a contin-
uation of previous material, she will now stipulate the existence of a discourse
relation. In this paper the only binary discourse relation that will be intro-
duced is simple sequencing, but see (Duchier and Gardent, 2001; Webber et al.,
2001; van Leusen, 2003) for more extended treatments of discourse relations in
grammar systems closely related to the present one. The set of descriptions is
now continued as follows.
(5) a. seq(5) ∧ 4 ≺1 5
b. he(6) ∧ 5 ≺1 6
c. feeds(7) ∧ 6 ≺1 7
d. it(8) ∧ 7 ≺1 8
The hypothesis in (3) can no longer be upheld, of course. But at this point it
can be replaced by the hypothesis in (6).
(6) ¬∃k 8 ≺ k
The input description associated with a given text T will consist of the conjunc-
tion of all descriptions collected in this way, including the hypothesis that no
material follows T . For example, the input description for ‘Pedro has a mule.
He feeds it.’ will be the conjunction of the logical sentences in (2), (5), and (6).
2.2 Axioms
The knowledge modelled by a grammar G can be separated into lexical knowl-
edge (to be discussed in section 4) and general grammatical knowledge. We will
assume here that the latter contains at least the following.
• Knowledge about linguistic trees;
• Knowledge about the ‘anchoring’ of tree nodes; anchoring provides a mech-
anism that makes lexical items combine;
• Knowledge about semantics.
For each of these forms of knowledge we provide axioms.
2.2.1 Axioms for Trees
Axioms A1–A5 below (see also (Cornell, 1994; Backofen, Rogers and Vijay-
Shankar, 1995)) make the binary relations + and ≺ behave like proper dom-
inance and precedence in linguistic trees, with r as root (k1 
∗ k2 will be an
abbreviation of k1 
+ k2 ∨ k1 = k2). Nodes in such trees may be labeled with
a labeling function `. For example, we may want to say that node n is labeled
dp by stating `(n) = dp. Axiom 6 rules out that label names such as dp and
vp corefer. Instantiations of this axiom scheme will be sentences like dp 6= vp
and ap 6= pp, etc. Axiom A7, lastly, requires lexical nodes to be leaf nodes. i.e.
nodes that do not properly dominate any other node.
6
A1 ∀k r ∗ k
A2 + and ≺ are strict partial orders
A3 ∀k1k2 [k1 ≺ k2 ∨ k2 ≺ k1 ∨ k1 
+ k2 ∨ k2 
+ k1 ∨ k1 = k2]
A4 ∀k1k2k3 [[k1 
+ k2 ∧ k1 ≺ k3]→ k2 ≺ k3]
A5 ∀k1k2k3 [[k1 
+ k2 ∧ k3 ≺ k1]→ k3 ≺ k2]
A6 c1 6= c2, if c1 and c2 are distinct label names
A7 ∀k1k2 [lex(k1)→ ¬k1 
+ k2]
2.2.2 The Anchoring Axiom
The next axiom plays an essential role in the mechanism that combines lexical
elements into larger units. The idea is that every tree node must be licensed
‘from below’ by a lexical element. Each node should also be licensed ‘from above’
by a lexical element. A node that is licensed ‘from below’ can be thought of
as ‘produced’ by the lexical element, while nodes licensed ‘from above’ need to
be ‘consumed’. Typical examples of the latter are argument nodes. The idea
essentially stems from Categorial Grammar, where arguments have a negative
occurrence in an element’s category and must match with positive occurrences
of other categories. (For the producer / consumer metaphor, see Linear Logic
(Girard, 1987), which is closely related to Categorial Grammar.)
If a node k′ licenses a node k ‘from below’ we write α+(k) = k′; that k′
licences k ‘from above’ is expressed by α−(k) = k′. α+(k) is called the positive
anchor of k; α−(k) its negative anchor. The axiom states that all positive and
negative anchors must be lexical.
A8 ∀k [lex(α+(k)) ∧ lex(α−(k))]
The effect of this axiom will become apparent in section 4.
2.2.3 Semantic Axioms
Three kinds of axioms will be needed for our semantics. There will be axioms
for the mechanism of binding, axioms for worlds, and an axiom that plays a role
in assigning local contexts to tree nodes. The notion of a local context derives
from (Karttunen, 1974). Here it will be a Discourse Representation Structure.
The local context of a node should well be distinguished from the semantics of
that node.
A9, A10 and A11 implement a version of the axioms for binding in (Muskens,
1991; Muskens, 1996; Muskens, 2001). We write V (v, i) for ‘the value of register
v in state i’ and if δ1, . . . , δn are terms of type π, we write i[δ1 . . . δn]j for
∀v [(v 6= δ1 ∧ . . . ∧ v 6= δn) → V (v
′, i) = V (v′, j)] (i.e. ‘i and j differ at most
in δ1, . . . , δn’).
4 The first axiom says that, in each state, each register can
4v must be chosen as the first variable in some fixed ordering which is not free in δ1, . . . , δn.
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be updated selectively, i.e. its value can be set to any x while the values of
other registers can remain unchanged. This axiom makes states and registers
essentially behave as assignments and variables in predicate logic. (The last
remark is fleshed out in (Muskens, 2001).)
A9 ∀i∀v∀x ∃j [i[v]j ∧ V (v, j) = x]
A10 ∀kk′ ρ(k) 6= ρ′(k′), if ρ, ρ′ ∈ {u, o, w} are distinct
A11 ∀k1k2 [ρ(k1) = ρ(k2)→ k1 = k2], if ρ ∈ {u, o, w}
We let u, o, and w be functions from nodes to registers. Axiom A10 ensures
that the images of these functions are disjoint, while A11 requires each to be
injective. In this way we make sure that fresh registers come with each node.
This in turn will make it easy to let indefinites be associated with new discourse
referents. The values of u will typically be associated with new referents, while
the values of o are referents that belong to the ‘background’ of the discourse.
The values of w are registers that can store worlds. In this paper we will only
use w(r), the w value of the root.5 A notational convention that we find useful
is to write arguments of u, o, and w as subscripts, e.g. u3 instead of u(3), wr
instead of w(r) etc.
While states correspond to assignments and registers correspond to variables,
the notion of a possible world of course corresponds to the technical notion of a
model. We will make some use of possible worlds here, but will not change the
logic—a step often associated with their introduction. Instead we will consider
possible worlds to be objects of type e, i.e. we will simply take them to be
(abstract) entities. The predicate letter W will be used for the predicate ‘is a
world’ and E will be an existence predicate, so that E(x, y) stands for ‘object x
exists in world y’ and λx.E(x, y) is y’s domain. In our semantics we shall make
use of a (finite) set L of predicate letters ({Pedro, has, mule, feeds, . . . }) all of
whose arguments are of type e and whose last arguments are to be interpreted
as worlds. E.g. has(x, y, z) should be read as ‘x has y in world z’. The following
axiom scheme requires that last arguments indeed are worlds and, somewhat
rigorously, demands that all other arguments of an L relation denote objects in
this world’s domain.6
A12 ∀x1 . . . xn y [R(x1, . . . , xn, y)→ (W (y)∧E(x1, y)∧ . . .∧E(xn, y))], for
each R ∈ L
While A9 in a sense required there to be enough states present for the binding
mechanism to work, the next axiom scheme puts similar requirements on the
sets of individuals and worlds. Since we want to use our logic as a metalan-
guage for English, it would be nice to have a notion of entailment around at
5But in extensions containing modal operators it would be natural to use other values of
w as well.
6This will serve present purposes. That the requirement needs to be fine-tuned can be seen
from such classic examples such as ‘worship’, where the object argument need not exist. The
axiom also will need to be adapted if accessibility relations between worlds are considered,
something we shall not do in this paper.
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the level of the logic (of course we already have a notion of entailment at the
‘metametalevel’—the present level of description). Entailment is obtained by
quantification over models, or, since the latter’s role is played by worlds at the
logic’s level, by quantification over worlds: an entailment holds if the conclusion
is true in all worlds in which the premises are true. But this requires all worlds
to be available; otherwise counterexamples to an entailment might be missed.
A requirement that really ensures all or all countable worlds to be present in
all models does not seem to be formulable with finitary and first order means
and since we do not wish to use too heavy artillery we therefore make do with
a requirement that at least all finite worlds be present; for our natural language
application this seems a very reasonable approximation.7
This will be ensured in the following way. Define an L-atom to be an atomic
formula R(t1, . . . , tn) with R ∈ L. An L-literal is an L-atom or the negation of
an L-atom. The following axiom scheme may be instantiated by any number of
variables x1, . . . , xn and any conjunction of L-literals ϕ(x1, . . . , xn, y) satisfying
the conditions stated.
A13 ∃x1 . . . xny [W (y) ∧ x1 6= x2 ∧ x1 6= x3 ∧ . . . ∧ xn−1 6= xn ∧
∀x [E(x, y) ↔ (x = x1 ∨ . . . ∨ x = xn)] ∧ ϕ(x1, . . . , xn, y)],
where ϕ(x1, . . . , xn, y) is a conjunction of L-literals with at most x1, . . . , xn
and y free that does not contain both an L-atom and its negation.
This axiom scheme will have instantiations such as, say,
∃x1x2x3y[W (y) ∧ x1 6= x2 ∧ x1 6= x3 ∧ x2 6= x3
∧ ∀x [E(x, y) ↔ (x = x1 ∨ x = x2 ∨ x = x3)]
∧ has(x1, x2, y) ∧ ¬has(x2, x3, y) ∧mule(x2, y) ∧ hay(x3, y)] .
Thus every finite world is stipulated to exist, as we can easily produce an ex-
haustive description in this way (a so-called ‘diagram’). Note that this does not
only ensure the existence of many worlds but also the existence of a multiplicity
of states. Since, according to A9, each register of a state can be selectively
updated with type e values, and since worlds are type e objects, each state will
have many variants differing only from it in the value of the register wr .
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We turn to the axiom about local contexts. The local context of a node k will
be a Discourse Representation Structure Γ(k) that can be computed from the
local contexts and semantics of other nodes. A14 states that the local context
of any non-S or non-T node (T is the category of texts) equals the local context
of its mother (if it has one). Here k1  k2 abbreviates k1 
+ k2 ∧¬∃k[k1 
+ k ∧
k + k2], i.e.  denotes the immediate dominance relation.
A14 ∀k1k2 [[k1  k2 ∧ `(k2) 6= s ∧ `(k2) 6= t]→ Γ(k2) = Γ(k1)]
How the local contexts of S nodes and T nodes are to be computed will be
regulated in the lexicon.
7Compare (van Benthem, 1986), where it is argued that, in order to keep complexity down,
natural language semantics should concentrate on finite models.
8States that have worlds in u or o registers are not formally excluded, but are of no
relevance. We will also not bother to formally exclude that worlds are elements of the domains
of (other) worlds.
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3 A Fine-grained Compositional DRT
In this section we will give some definitions that will make key concepts of
Discourse Representation Theory available. The definitions are based upon the
semantic axioms that were given above and the DRT concepts that result will
be needed in our further discussion of Logical Description Grammars and it is
for this reason that we interrupt the treatment of the latter.
The approach here will have much in common with that of (Muskens, 1996),
but will also differ from it in an important respect. What the two approaches
have in common is that both are based on a transcription of truth conditions for
DRT, carried out within an axiomatic extension of type logic (minor variations
of the binding axioms that are relevant here are also present in (Muskens, 1996)).
The difference between the two treatments results from the fact that while in
(Muskens, 1996) the DRT truth conditions that were transcribed were those of
(Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1991, definition 26), here we will use a variant of
the semantics in (Zeevat, 1989). The reason for this difference in treatment lies
not only in our wish to emphasize the flexibility of the ‘transcription’ approach,
but also in the fact that in this way we get a more fine-grained DRT semantics
(in the sense that we get stronger requirements on the identity of DRSs), which
suits our present purposes better.
Some abbreviations introducing set-theoretic notation will come in handy.
Definition 1 Let A1, . . . , An be terms of some type α and let X be the first
variable of that type not free in these terms, then
{A1, . . . , An} abbreviates λX [X = A1 ∨ . . . ∨X = An] .
Furthermore, let A and B be terms of some type (α1(· · · (αnt) · · ·)) and let
X1, . . . , Xn be variables such that each Xi is of tye αi. Then
A ∪ B abbreviates λX1 . . . Xn [AX1 . . . Xn ∨ BX1 . . . Xn] ,
A ∩ B abbreviates λX1 . . . Xn [AX1 . . . Xn ∧ BX1 . . . Xn] ,
A ⊆ B abbreviates ∀X1 . . . Xn [AX1 . . . Xn → BX1 . . .Xn] .
In (Zeevat, 1989) the semantic value of a Discourse Representation Structure K
is a pair consisting of (a) a set of discourse referents (the universe of K) and (b)
a set of assignments. The latter consists of all those assignments that verify all
conditions in K. This could easily be transposed to the present set-up by letting
the first part of any DRS K consist of a set of registers (type πt) and its second
part of a set of states (type st), so that the type of DRSs would be πt × st.
However, we opt for a variant of this approach and will deviate from Zeevat’s
treatment in two respects. Firstly, we will follow (Visser, 1994) in keeping track
of the free discourse referents in any DRS or condition (see also (van Eijck and
Kamp, 1997)). This can be done by letting conditions be pairs of (a) sets of
states and (b) sets of registers (those that are free in the condition). The type
of a condition will then become st× πt.
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The second deviation from Zeevat is that we will let the second part of a
DRS K consist of a set of conditions rather than of a single condition repre-
senting their conjunction. Having sets of conditions around without conjoining
their members embodies the hypothesis that the language system sometimes
addresses one of these in isolation. In (van Leusen, 2003) it is argued, for exam-
ple, that the effect of a correction can be a selective downdate of a DRS, with
some conditions disappearing while others remain. With these modifications
the type of DRSs becomes πt× (st× πt)t, which we will often abbreviate as τ .
The alternative formalization will give stronger identity criteria on DRSs.
Given that the free referents of a condition form its second element, the free
referents of any DRS K can easily be computed: these are the ones that are
free in some condition of K but are not in the universe of K. A DRS will be
proper if it has no free referents. These notions are made available to the logic
with the following definitions.
free(K) abbreviates λv∃c [¬fst(K)(v) ∧ snd(K)(c) ∧ snd(c)(v)]
proper(K) abbreviates ¬∃v free(K)(v)
The two following notions play a key role in the algebra of Discourse Represen-
tation Structures.
Definition 2 Let K and K ′ be terms of type τ .
K ⊕K ′ abbreviates 〈fst(K) ∪ fst(K ′), snd(K) ∪ snd(K ′)〉
K v K ′ abbreviates fst(K) ⊆ fst(K ′) ∧ snd(K) ⊆ snd(K ′)
We will typically be interested in type τ objects 〈{δ1, . . . , δn}, {γ1, . . . , γm}〉 with
a finite universe {δ1, . . . , δn} and a finite set of conditions {γ1, . . . , γm}. Such
DRSs we prefer to write as [δ1 . . . δn | γ1, . . . , γm], in a way reminiscent of the
usual ‘box’ notation for DRSs.
While we essentially follow the Zeevat approach to the semantics of Discourse
Representation here, the dynamic treatment of (Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1991;
Muskens, 1996) is still available. The Groenendijk-Stokhof interpretation of a
DRS K can be defined as the relation gs(K) between states i and j such that i
differs from j at most as far as the universe of K is concerned and j verifies all
conditions in K. In other words, gs(K) can be taken to abbreviate
λij(∀v [¬fst(K)(v)→ V (v, i) = V (v, j)] ∧ ∀c(snd(K)(c)→ fst(c)(j))) .
On the finite DRSs we are interested in, this leads to the more readable equation
gs([δ1 . . . δn | γ1, . . . , γm]) = λij (i[δ1 . . . δn]j ∧ fst(γ1)(j) ∧ . . . ∧ fst(γm)(j)) .
Note that the natural algebraic operations on DRSs are different from those
on their Groenendijk-Stokhof interpretations. On the former the essentially
Boolean ⊕ rules; the latter is a relational algebra with relational composition
as one of its natural operations.
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A DRS K is true in a state i if there is a j, differing from i at most as far
as the universe of K is concerned, such that j verifies all conditions in K. We
will write true(K) for λi∃j gs(K)(i)(j). true(K) therefore denotes the domain
of gs(K) and
true([δ1 . . . δn | γ1, . . . , γm]) = λi∃j (i[δ1 . . . δn]j ∧ fst(γ1)(j) ∧ . . . ∧ fst(γm)(j)) .
The notion of DRS truth immediately leads to a notion of DRS consequence:
K ′ is said to follow from K if A1, . . . ,A14 |= true(K) ⊆ true(K ′), i.e. if K ′ is
true in all states i in which K is true, in any model of the axioms.9 This notion
can be relativised to any description D by saying that K ′ follows from K given
D if D,A1, . . . ,A14 |= true(K) ⊆ true(K ′). It will be seen shortly how a similar
notion can be obtained on the level of the describing logic.
Until now we have not paid much attention to the internal structure of DRSs,
but the next definition gives notation for conditions.
Definition 3 Let R ∈ L, let δ1, . . . , δn be terms of type π (discourse referents),
and let K and K ′ be terms of type τ (DRSs). Then
R{δ1, . . . , δn} abbreviates 〈λi.R(V (δ1, i), . . . , V (δn, i)), {δ1, . . . , δn}〉
δ1 is δ2 abbreviates 〈λi.V (δ1, i) = V (δ2, i), {δ1, δ2}〉
not K abbreviates 〈λi.¬true(K)(i), free(K)〉
K ⇒ K ′ abbreviates not (K ⊕ [ | not K ′])
K or K ′ abbreviates 〈true(K) ∪ true(K ′), free(K) ∪ free(K ′)〉
Note that R{δ1, . . . , δn} predicates R of the values of δ1, . . . , δn in some state, not
of these registers themselves. We shall write R{δ, wr} as wr: Rδ and R{δ1, δ2, wr}
as wr: δ1Rδ2.
Let us consider the sublanguage of type st×πt and type τ terms that is given
by the following Backus-Naur form, and dub it the DRT sublanguage. Here the
δ range over π terms that have the form ρ(n), where ρ ∈ {u, o, w} and n is a
node name. The R are taken from L.
γ ::= R{δ1, . . . , δn} | δ1 is δ2 | not K | K ⇒ K
′ | K or K ′
K ::= [δ1 . . . δn | γ1, . . . , γm]
It is useful to know that there are simple truth-preserving translations from the
DRT sublanguage to predicate logic. The following one is taken from (Muskens,
1996) (but see also (Kamp and Reyle, 1993)).
Definition 4 Let † be a function that injectively maps each δ to a variable
of type e. The function tr from st × πt terms in the DRT sublanguage to
predicate logical formulas and the function wp, which takes a pair consisting of
9This gives an existential interpretation to all discourse referents that are present in the
top level of a DRS. In section 5 below we shall consider a revised notion of truth, easily
definable in terms of the present one, in which some of the top level referents get a referential
interpretation.
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a τ term and a predicate logical formula and yields a predicate logical formula,
are defined as follows.
tr(R{δ1, . . . , δn}) = R(δ
†
1, . . . , δ
†
n)





tr(not K) = ¬wp(K,>)
tr(K ⇒ K ′) = ¬wp(K,¬wp(K ′,>))
tr(K or K ′) = wp(K,>) ∨wp(K ′,>)
wp([δ1 . . . δn | γ1, . . . , γm], χ) = ∃δ
†
1 . . . δ
†
n [tr(γ1) ∧ . . . ∧ tr(γm) ∧ χ]
For any formula ϕ and state variable i, let ϕi be the result of substituting V (δ, i)
for δ†, for each δ† that is free in ϕ. The following holds.
Theorem 1 Let K be a τ term in the DRT sublanguage and let i be an arbitrary
type s variable. Let Γ contain all statements δ 6= δ′, for every pair δ, δ′ of
syntactically different discourse referents in K. Then
Γ,A1, . . . ,A14 |= wp(K,>)i ↔ true(K)(i)
The disequality statements are needed: If, say, 12 and 9 corefer, it follows that
[u12 | wr:mule u9] and [u9 | wr :mule u9] corefer as well, but the translation
would not preserve this. In practice this will be no limitation at all. For a
proof of the theorem, use induction on complexity in the DRT sublanguage
construction to show that, given the axioms and disequalities, wp(K, χ)i ↔
∃j [gs(K)(i)(j) ∧ χj ] and tr(γ)i ↔ γ(i), for all K and γ. This can be shown
using the methods of (Muskens, 1996; Muskens, 2001).
In the next section we will set up a logical mechanism that will assign DRSs
or λ-terms involving DRSs to nodes as their semantic values. At many levels the
special discourse referent wr for worlds will be free in such DRSs. However, it
will be ensured that wr is always present in the universes of the ‘local contexts’
of these nodes, and indeed in the global context, or background B, that we
associate with the start element ‘>’ (these will be proper DRSs). We will want
to put (presuppositional) constraints on contexts and typically these constraints
can take two forms. One possibility is to require that a context contains certain
material. For example, for lexical nodes k that carry the proper name ‘Pedro’,
we will demand that [ok | wr:Pedro ok] v B. Another possibility is that a
context is required to bear a certain logical relation to another DRS K, where
K typically does not have wr in its universe. Below we will have a brief look at
Karttunen’s theory of presuppositions, which provides an example, as it requires
that presuppositions follow from their local context.10
10A second example that springs to mind are the consistency and informativity (non-
entailment) requirements in Van der Sandt’s theory of presupposition. An extension of our
theory that would allow for local and intermediate accommodation would also make it possible
to give a declarative version of Van der Sandt’s theory. A third example are the felicity con-
straints associated with discourse relations in (van Leusen, 2003), which are also formulated
in terms of entailment and consistency. It turns out that while some discourse relations re-
quire consistency and informativity, others, such as denial and confirmation, impose opposite
constraints.
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These considerations make it necessary that logical relations such as entail-
ment and consistency can be expressed or approximated at the level of the de-
scribing logic, but this has essentially been taken care of in the previous section.
Suppose that K is a DRS with wr in its universe, while K
′ does not have wr in
its universe. Then the condition K ⇒ K ′ quantifies over possible worlds. This
is best illustrated with an example: let us take K to be [wr o1 | wr:mule o1],
‘there is a mule’, and let K ′ be [u2 | wr: farmer u2, wr: u2 owns o1], ‘some
farmer owns the mule’, so that K ′ should not be made to follow from K. Then,
for arbitrary i,11
tr(K ⇒ K ′)i = ∀y∀x1 [mule(x1, y)→ ∃x2 [farmer(x2, y) ∧ owns(x2, x1, y)]] .
In view of A12 this is equivalent with
∀y[W (y)→ ∀x1 [(mule(x1, y) ∧ E(x1, y))→
∃x2 [E(x2, y) ∧ farmer(x2, y) ∧ owns(x2, x1, y)]]] ,
from which it is seen that indeed quantification over worlds is involved. Note
that A13 immediately provides a singleton-domain counterexample to this pur-
ported strict implication and in general it will give finite counterexamples if
there are such.
Conditions K ⇒ K ′ are of type st× πt and we will typically want to state
conditions on the t level. The following definition adds the necessary quantifi-
cation over states / assignments.
Definition 5 Let K and K ′ be terms of type τ .
K | K ′ abbreviates ∀i fst(K ⇒ K ′)(i)
4 LDG: Lexical Descriptions and Reasoning
We return to our exposition of the mechanics of LDG. The main themes will be
the LDG lexicon and an explanation of the kind of reasoning that LDG allows.
4.1 Lexical Descriptions
There will be two kinds of lexical description, classifying descriptions and ele-
mentary tree descriptions. Of these, the elementary tree descriptions carry most
information, but the classifying descriptions play a useful role in connecting el-
ementary tree descriptions with open class words.
4.1.1 Classifying Descriptions
In (7) classifying descriptions for the open class words Pedro, has, and mule
are given. (7a) states that whenever a node k carries the word has, it must
be classified as a transitive verb (tv) and its semantics σπ(πτ)(k) is λv′λv[ |
11Here K ⇒ K′ is closed. This will be the typical situation in applications.
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wr: v has v
′]. (If α is a type, we will let σα denote a function from tree nodes
to objects of type α.) The description for mule in (7b) is similar, but the word
is classified as a common noun (cn) and its semantics has a different type.
(7) a. ∀k[has(k)→ (tv(k) ∧ σπ(πτ)(k) = λv′λv[ | wr: v has v
′])]
b. ∀k[mule(k)→ (cn(k) ∧ σπτ (k) = λv[ | wr :mule v])]
c. ∀k[pedro(k)→ (pn(k) ∧ σπ(k) = ok ∧ [ok | wr:Pedro ok] v B)]
The classifying description for Pedro in (7c), lastly, is of a slightly different
nature. Here the semantics is set to the discourse referent ok, but an additional
requirement enforces that the global context or background of the discourse, for
which we use the type τ constant B, contains the DRS [ok | wr:Pedro ok].
This in fact implements the usual DRT requirement that discourse referents
connected with names must be present in the universe of the main DRS and that
any descriptive material connected with such discourse referents must likewise
be available globally.
4.1.2 Elementary Tree Descriptions
Let us now turn to the second kind of lexical descriptions, elementary tree
descriptions. The idea behind these is based upon work in Tree Adjoining
Grammars (Joshi, Levy and Takahashi, 1975; Schabes, 1990) and in particu-
lar upon the so-called D-Tree Grammars of (Vijay-Shankar, 1992; Rambow et
al., 1995).12 An elementary tree description states what must be true in any
acceptable structure if some lexical node has certain given properties.
(8) ∀k[tv(k)→ ∃k1k2k3k4k5[`(k) = v ∧ `(k1) = s ∧ `(k2) = dp ∧
`(k3) = vp ∧ `(k4) = vp ∧ `(k5) = dp ∧∆(k1, k2, k3) ∧∆(k4, k, k5) ∧
k3 
∗ k4 ∧ σ(k4) = σ(k)(σ(k5)) ∧ σ(k1) = σ(k3)(σ(k2)) ∧
k
+
←↩ {k, k1, k4} ∧ k
−
←↩ {k, k2, k3, k5}]]
For example, (8), which uses the abbreviations in Definition 6 below, is an
elementary tree description saying that whenever a tree contains a transitive
verb, it must have certain other properties as well. The transitive verb must
be labeled ‘V’, it must have a dominating node labeled ‘VP’, which in turn
dominates a node labeled ‘DP’, etc. The description also contains anchoring
information and semantic information.
Definition 6 Let t, t1, . . . , tn vary over terms of type ν.
∆(t, t1, t2) abbreviates t  t1 ∧ t  t2 ∧ t1 ≺ t2
t
+
←↩ {t1, . . . , tn} abbreviates ∀k(α
+(k) = t↔ (k = t1 ∨ . . . ∨ k = tn))
t
−
←↩ {t1, . . . , tn} abbreviates ∀k(α
−(k) = t↔ (k = t1 ∨ . . . ∨ k = tn))
12For the relation between Tree Adjoining Grammars, D-Tree Grammars and the present
format, see (Muskens, 2001).
15
In general, an elementary tree description will have the form
∀k[cond(k)→ ∃k1 . . . kn[χ(k1 . . . kn) ∧ k
+




←↩ {k′′1 , . . . , k
′′
q }]]
where cond is some condition, χ is a conjunction of formulas, and




1 , . . . , k
′′
q } = {k, k1, . . . , kn} .
The condition cond can be a predicate like tv or cn, associated with a whole
class of elementary trees, it can be one of the discourse elements > or seq, but
also any of the predicates associated with words (such as pedro, has, etc.).
4.1.3 A Simple Graphical Notation
Even with the abbreviations of Definition 6 in place elementary tree descriptions
such as the one in (8) are unwieldy. It is therefore expedient to change to a
graphical notation that is easier to work with even if it is somewhat less precise.










The conventions that were followed in obtaining (9) from (8) are the following.
1. Nodes are labeled as usual and node names (variables or constants) are
given as subscripts.
2. Solid lines stand for immediate dominance () relations. Left-right order-
ing between sisters or between terminal nodes stands for precedence (≺).
Dashed lines stand for dominance (∗).
3. Nodes which are positively but not negatively anchored to the lexical
node in an elementary tree description are marked +, while nodes which
are negatively but not positively anchored are marked −. Nodes which
are anchored both ways are saturated and unmarked. The situation that
a node is not anchored at all will never occur and the anchor itself may be
marked with a 3. It is understood that k
+
←↩ {k1, . . . , kn} is asserted if k is
the lexical node and k1, . . . , kn are all the nodes that are marked + or are
unmarked, and, similarly, that k
−
←↩ {k1, . . . , kn} is part of the depicted
description if k1, . . . , kn are all nodes that are marked − or unmarked.
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4. The semantic value σα(k) of a node k may be written under it and any
other information may be written into the tree as well. Superscripts on
σ will often be dropped. Type ν arguments may be written as subscripts
and we typically write σk for σ(k). Conventions to also write Γk for Γ(k),
and ρk for ρ(k) (ρ ∈ {u, o, w}) were already introduced.
Since the official representations of elementary tree descriptions can always be
reconstructed from more user-friendly pictorial representations like the one in










The description in (9) covers the whole class of transitive verbs. If it is conjoined
with the information that k carries the lexeme has and with (7a) we get the
picture in (10). Note that the semantics of VPk4 now has a more complete
specification. For closed class words it may often be expedient to list elementary
tree descriptions in this form—with their anchoring words attached. Here, for
example is an entry for the indefinite a.
(11) S+k1
[uk | ]⊕ σk4(uk)⊕ σk2
S−k2






The idea here is that the DP that is projected from the indefinite translates as
a discourse referent uk and that the declaration of that discourse referent [uk | ]
and its restriction σk4 (uk) are quantified-in at some higher S level. Sk1 should
be compared to the place where adjunction of the DP takes place after Quan-
tifier Raising. In fact, if we require this S to properly dominate an additional
DP, as in (12) (where semantic information has been left out), we obtain trees
that are very close to LF trees in generative grammar (with DPk3 carrying all
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syntactic information and DPk5 possibly carrying semantic information). Since








Note that Γk2 , the local context of the lower S node in (11), is set to be
the merge of the local context of the higher S node and the ‘restrictor’ material
of the semantics of that higher node. The idea is that unresolved pronouns
may seek a referent in this local context, and that presuppositions may likewise
resolve to it.
More examples of elementary tree descriptions can be found in the Appendix.
4.2 Reasoning from Input Descriptions
Let us continue the discussion of the example we gave in the first parts of
this paper. Our hearer has judged the statements in (2) true on the basis of her
observations and has formed the temporary hypothesis that (3). She can now do
some reasoning. First, she may, using universal instantiation, combine her new
information with the elementary tree descriptions in her lexicon, substituting 3
for k in (11), for example. Next, she can take (fresh) witnesses for the existential
quantifiers in her elementary tree descriptions, substituting, say, 16 for k1, 17
for k2, 18 for k3, and 19 for k4 in the result and making similar substitutions in
the other descriptions. The result will be something like (13) (for elementary

































[u3 | ] ⊕ σ19(u3) ⊕ σ17
S−
17










λv[ | wr:mule v]
mule
Note that since the ≺ relation must be linear on the lexical elements and the ex-
isting information precludes that there are elements preceding or following the
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given lexical elements, or are interspersed between them, all lexical elements
must be one of 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4. From the anchoring information in the descrip-
tions in (13) it can be concluded that {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 11, 14, 16, 18} are the nodes
that are positively anchored to one of the lexical nodes and that, since every
node must be positively anchored, all nodes belong to this set. That these nodes
must be pairwise distinct also follows from the tree descriptions. In a similar
way, now using the information about negative anchoring, it can be concluded
that {0, 2, 3, r, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 19} likewise comprise the whole type ν domain
and are pairwise distinct. This means that these two sets must be equal and
that there must be a way to ‘pair off’ positively and negatively marked nodes
and identify the pairs. The only way to do this that is in accordance with the
tree axioms is given in (14).
(14) r = 9 ∧ 10 = 16 ∧ 11 = 17 ∧ 1 = 12 ∧ 13 = 14 ∧ 15 = 18 ∧ 4 = 9
If our hearer adds this inferred information to her description of the situation,
the picture in (15) results.
(15) Tr
[u3 | wr: o1 has u3, wr:mule u3]















Note that in (15) not only the positively and negatively marked nodes have been
‘clicked together’ in a process that is somewhat reminiscent of chemical bind-
ing, but that the identifications also allowed some semantic computation. The
semantics of r can be computed to be [u3 | wr : o1 has u3, wr:mule u3] and there
still is a constraint [o1 | wr:Pedro o1] v B on the background B. These two
pieces of information are typical of the kind of information that will be collected
during the processing of any discourse. The semantics of the root, σr, will be
interpreted as an update of the background, while other information constrains
the background. In section 4 we will put some general requirements on the
original background B (such as properness), but the basic idea is that the back-
ground must largely be constructed or negotiated by the discourse participants.
It will be only partially constrained by what is said during a conversation and it
will therefore remain largely underspecified. The meaning of the discourse given
a certain background B will be identified with B ⊕ σr, what was presupposed
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updated with what was said. In the present example this discourse meaning is






[u3 | wr: o1 has u3, wr:mule u3]













Γ22 = Γ21 ⊕ σ20
DP+
6


















[σ8 | ] v Γ8
it
Our hearer now has inferred certain information from (2) plus (3). But of course,
(3) was hypothetical and upon hearing more she may replace it with (5) plus
(6).13 In that case the picture in (16) emerges (here we have already combined
much of the material that was also in the earlier description). This picture fea-
tures an elementary description for the discourse relation ‘seq’, which extends a
given discourse (category T) with a subsequent sentence or discourse.14 Seman-
tically, sequencing results in the merge of the semantic values of its arguments.
Note that the local context of the right sister of the sequencing relation is set to
that of its mother node updated with the semantics of the left sister. Further-
more, note that the semantics of pronouns is not specified. While the indefinite
a is associated with a discourse referent u3 (which resulted from instantiating
k by 3 in (11)), the constraint on pronouns is that [σπk | ] v Γk (where k is
the pronoun’s node). This statement requires their semantics (a register) to be
present in the universe of their local context.
Again there is a unique way for the + and − nodes to click together and the
following picture results. Here, with the help of A14 and lexical information
13The question becomes important how much of a hearer’s reasoning is independent from
hypothetical ‘end’ statements such as (3) or (6). This independent part can be asserted
categorically and can monotonically be transferred to the next phase of the reasoning process.
Although this matter is important, we will not go into it here.
14In general, it may be assumed that discourse relations take discourse constituents as
their arguments, and that sentences (or clauses, as in (Webber et al., 2001)) figure as minimal
discourse constituents. Since discourse relations may vary in both the syntactic structure they
select and the semantic values they assign, various different elementary descriptions would be
provided in a fully fledged discourse grammar. We will not pursue this here; the coverage of
our little grammar is limited to the discourse relation ‘seq’, and the sentence connectives ‘if
. . . then’ and ‘or’ (see the appendix). In the absence of other types of discourse relation in the
grammar, the elementary structure of ‘seq’ presented above only allows for left branching tree
structures at discourse level. Intuitively, this means that the sequencing relation continues
the description of the whole of the situation described in the preceding discourse. Further
research will have to show whether this analysis is appropriate for sequencing (it is certainly
not appropriate for other discourse relations, such as concession or contrast). Right branching
discourse structure may be obtained if we allow the discourse relation to attach to sentences
as well as discourses in its left argument.
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about Γ, the local context of each of the pronouns has been computed to be
B ⊕ [u3 | wr : o1 has u3, wr:mule u3], the discourse meaning of the previous
chunk of discourse.
(17) Tr
[u3 | wr : o1 has u3, wr :mule u3, wr : σ6 feeds σ8]
[σ6 σ8 | ] v (B ⊕ [u3 | wr : o1 has u3, wr:mule u3])
T9
[u3 | wr : o1 has u3, wr:mule u3]




Pedro has a mule [seq]
S23
he feeds it
The next section will contain further discussion of the semantic constraints that
have now been collected.
5 Further DRT Construction as Inference from Input De-
scriptions
Above we have seen how a hearer’s reasoning from an input description resulted
in the piecewise compositional construction of parts of a Discourse Represen-
tation Structure. Even though the grammar and each input description have
a strictly declarative formulation, inferences that take these as their point of
departure, being inferences, have a procedural and computational character. In
this section it will be seen that it is possible for a hearer to do further inference
using the kind of description that was arrived at in (17) and that such further
reasoning results in the kind of highly procedural steps posited by the DRT
construction algorithm.
In the following the notion of background will continue to play an important
role. This background B should be thought of as consisting of whatever is pre-
supposed during the conversation in question. Obviously, what is presupposed
should be highly underspecified, as it is open for negotiation between discussion
participants. The background will be constrained by presuppositions that arise
in the discourse and there are also a few general constraints. These are summed
up in A15: First, we take it that the background is proper. Modulo the naming
of discourse referents, it should be possible for a background to have arisen out
of previous discourse (with original background [wr | ]). Since discourse gener-
ates only proper DRSs, backgrounds too should be proper. A second constraint
is that the universe of the background does not contain registers that are values
of u, as the latter will be reserved for discourse referents that arise during con-
versation. A last requirement on the background is that its universe contains
wr as an element.
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A15 proper(B) ∧ ¬∃k fst(B)(uk) ∧ fst(B)(wr)
Discourse referents that are present in the universe of the background arguably
should be interpreted referentially rather than existentially. The referent wr,
which stands for the world of evaluation, may serve as an illustration, for Pedro
has a mule should not be interpreted as ‘there is some world in which Pedro
has a mule’ but as ‘Pedro has a mule in this world.’ The discourse referent
corresponding to Pedro should also be interpreted as given and similarly should
deictic pronouns and perhaps even definite descriptions whose referent is accom-
modated. A notion of truth that treats all background referents referentially will
result if the previous definition of truth is revised in the following way: K is said
to be true in i with respect to background B if true(〈fst(K)− fst(B), snd(K)〉)(i)
holds, i.e. referents present in the background’s universe will not be interpreted
existentially but will receive their interpretation from the state i. It will be as-
sumed that discourse participants interpret the discourse with respect to some
state i0 that they take the discourse to be about
15 and we will often be interested
in the truth of some DRS K in i0 with respect to a given background.
To illustrate this further, let us consider the DRS K =
[wr o1 u3 | wr :Pedro o1, wr: o1 has u3, wr:mule u3]
and assume that wr and o1, but not u3, are members of the universe of back-
ground B. If, in general, we agree, for readability, to write δ0 for V (δ, i0), we
can express the truth of K in i0 with respect to B as










r) ∧mule (x3, w
0
r)]
Here the values of o01 and w
0
r depend on the state i0, which functions much as
an external anchor in the sense of (Kamp and Reyle, 1993, pp. 246–248).16
With the notion of background now elucidated, let us see how reasoning from
input descriptions can result in a process familiar from DRT: While indefinites
create fresh referents, pronouns will pick up old referents (or must get a deictic
interpretation). The material connected with proper names is relegated to the
main Discourse Representation Structure. Relatedly, presuppositions may either
get bound or must be accommodated. At present, we can only account for global
accommodation, but we consider it possible for a treatment such as the present
15Austin (1961): “A statement is said to be true when the historic state of affairs to which
it is correlated by the demonstrative conventions (the one to which it ‘refers’) is of a type with
which the sentence used in making it is correlated by the descriptive conventions.” In the
present context, i0 (or its sequence of values) can be compared to Austin’s ‘historic state of
affairs’. Presumably, our states are somewhat richer than Austin’s states of affairs, for besides
a possible world they contain values for all kinds of referents. On Austinian propositions, see
also (Barwise and Perry, 1983).
16While (Kamp and Reyle, 1993) use anchors only for proper names, our use is wider as we
let i0 interpret all referents in the discourse’s background. There is some room for fine-tuning
here and it may also be held that some referents from the background are referential while
others are interpreted existentially.
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one to be extended to also cover local and intermediate accommodation. We
will discuss these points in turn, ending with a reminder that the theory gives
a natural account of underspecification, so that we are in fact working in an
Underspecified Discourse Representation Theory, such as the one pioneered in
(Reyle, 1993).
5.1 Proper names land up in the main DRS.
The elementary tree description for Pedro contained the statement in (18a), re-
quiring the semantic material connected with the name to be in the background.
(18) a. [o1 | wr:Pedro o1] v B
b. [wr o1 | wr:Pedro o1] v B
c. σr = [u3 | wr: o1 has u3, wr:mule u3, wr: σ6 feeds σ8]
d. [wr o1 u3 | wr:Pedro o1, wr: o1 has u3, wr :mule u3, wr: σ6 feeds σ8] v
B ⊕ σr
In fact, using A15, this can be strengthened slightly to (18b). Using (18c)
(which was found in (17)), the hearer can now derive (18d). The discourse
meaning B ⊕ σr must contain (and therefore entail) a certain DRS containing
the material connected with the name. It should be clear that this is in fact a
form of global accommodation.
5.2 Indefinites create fresh referents, but pronouns pick up old refer-
ents.
That indefinites create fresh referents is a property they share with many other
expressions. Their creation is a by-product of the perpetual creation of fresh
node names. The referent u3 connected with the indefinite a in (17) was created
in this way. The moment that it was established that there was some node 3
carrying the lexeme a the referent u3 also sprung into existence. Note that,
by the injectivity of u, u3 cannot corefer with a referent created at any other
node.17 Since, by A15, u3 can not be an element of the universe of B and since,
by the same axiom, B is proper, there can also be no condition in B in which
u3 occurs. The referent is therefore truly fresh to the discourse.
The process whereby pronouns get bound by referents that already exist
takes a little more care to explain. In (19a) a constraint is shown that was
collected in (17). It resulted from the requirement on pronouns that [σπk |
] v Γk (with k the node carrying the pronoun). This was required of the he
and it nodes and in both cases the local context Γk could be computed to be
B ⊕ [u3 | wr: o1 has u3, wr:mule u3]. Using (18b) and the idempotency of ⊕ it
is seen that in fact (19b) must hold.
17Of course the value of another referent may be identical with the value V (u3, i) of u3 at
any given state i. The difference between identity of referents and identity of their values is
crucial to the present discussion.
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(19) a. [σ6 σ8 | ] v B ⊕ [u3 | wr: o1 has u3, wr:mule u3]
b. [σ6 σ8 | ] v B ⊕ [wr o1 u3 | wr :Pedro o1, wr: o1 has u3, wr:mule u3]
This puts constraints on what σ6 and σ8 are, but there are still many possibilities
for these referents to resolve. In principle this is what we want, as linguistic
information typically underspecifies how pronouns should resolve. However, the
constraints collected thus far leave open too many possibilities and therefore
more constraints are needed.
In order to illustrate this, let us concentrate on σ8 and see what values it
can take. One possibility is that the pronoun it has no linguistic antecedent and
that σ8 is to be identified with some register that was in the universe of the
background B but is not mentioned in the discourse. We think this possibility
is in fact welcome and corresponds to a reading of the text in which it refers to
an object that is somehow salient (for example, as a result of pointing) but that
was not introduced by linguistic means. We identify this with the deictic use of
the pronoun.
Technically, there is also the possibility that σ8 is in fact equal to wr. This
possibility is an artefact and a consequence of our choice to have one type of
register for worlds and individuals. We exclude it by postulating that no node
can have wr as its semantics.
A16 ¬∃k σπk = wr
A fuller treatment should perhaps comprise a more general type or kind distinc-
tion of the registers involved, so that A16 would fall out as a consequence.
Of the remaining possibilities, the identification σ8 = o1 should be excluded
on linguistically more interesting grounds. Since Pedro, has masculine gender, it
cannot antecede it, which is neuter. Since this does not follow from the theory
we have set up thus far, and since it is of course just one manifestation of a
phenomenon that really pervades language, we must add a general mechanism
for feature constraints. In fact this is very easy and (Muskens, 2001) shows how
it can be done on the basis of the first-order feature theory of (Johnson, 1991).
We refer to the discussion in (Muskens, 2001) for details. Using the notation
of that paper, a general requirement to the effect that coreferring nodes should
agree (on number and gender) could be formulated as follows.
(20) ∀kk′ [σπk = σ
π
k′ → ∀f [arc(k ,agr, f)→ arc(k
′ ,agr, f)]]
This could be added as an axiom, together with the three axioms (axiom
schemes) for features in (Muskens, 2001). Note the mixed semantic / syntactic
character of (20). This is a case of genuine mutual constraint between syntax
and semantics.
With a mechanism for features such as the one described in place, there are
two possibilities left for the denotation of σ8: σ8 = u3 or σ8 /∈ {wr, o1, u3}.
Similarly the hearer can deduce that either σ6 = o1 or σ6 /∈ {wr, o1, u3}. In fact
the following four possibilities remain.
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(21) a. [wr o1 u3 | wr:Pedro o1, wr : o1 has u3, wr:mule u3, wr: o1 feeds u3] v
B ⊕ σr
b. [wr o1 u3 σ8 | wr:Pedro o1, wr: o1 has u3, wr:mule u3, wr: o1 feeds σ8] v
B ⊕ σr ∧ [σ8 | ] 6v [wr o1 u3 | ]
c. [wr o1 u3 σ6 | wr:Pedro o1, wr: o1 has u3, wr:mule u3, wr: σ6 feeds u3] v
B ⊕ σr ∧ [σ6 | ] 6v [wr o1 u3 | ]
d. [wr o1 u3 σ6 σ8 | wr:Pedro o1, wr: o1 has u3, wr:mule u3, wr: σ6 feeds σ8] v
B ⊕ σr ∧ [σ6 | ] 6v [wr o1 u3 | ] ∧ [σ8 | ] 6v [wr o1 u3 | ]
The first possibility corresponds to the preferred reading, the second to the case
where it was taken deictically, the third to a deictic reading of he, and the fourth
to the case where both pronouns pick up an extralinguistic referent. The hearer
must now make a choice as to what was meant on the basis of what she knows or
may assume is in the background, i.e. further narrowing down of the possibilities
may be a result of pragmatic reasoning. Note that each four of the possibilities
offers suitable input for the translation that was given in Definition 4 and that
in each case all relevant discourse markers can be shown to be disequal (the
precondition to Theorem 1). In each case certain conclusions can be drawn
from the assumption that B ⊕ σr is true in i0 with respect to background B.
These conclusions are, respectively
(22) a. ∃x [Pedro (o01, w
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While in this example only linguistically acceptable pronoun resolutions were
left, other suitability constraints are necessary in other cases. One set of con-
straints that immediately springs to mind is that of the syntactic Binding Theory
(Chomsky, 1981). The Binding Theory is stated in terms of the following tree
geometric notions.
(23) a. Node k c-commands node k′ if every branching node dominating k
dominates k′.
b. A node is bound if it is coindexed with a c-commanding node.
c. A node is free if it is not bound.
It is clear that these notions can be made available in our logic if we read ‘k
and k′ are coindexed’ as σπ(k) = σπ(k′). The Binding Theory itself consists of
the following three principles.
(A) An anaphor is bound in its governing category
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(B) A pronominal is free in its governing category
(C) An R-expression is free
Here ‘anaphor’ should be read as ‘reflexive or reciprocal’, while the category of
‘pronominals’ includes non-reflexive pronouns and ‘R-expressions’ are DPs that
are not pronouns. The syntactic literature contains much discussion about the
correct definition of ‘governing category’, but a rough approximation is that the
governing category of a node k is the lowest k′ properly dominating k that is
labelled DP or S. Again it is obvious that principles (A), (B), and (C) can be
formalized as additional constraints within the present theory.
Note that the constraints we have discussed are all stated in a single describ-
ing logic, even though they came from syntax and semantics, two separate levels
of the grammar. In fact, the resolution of pronouns obviously is also constrained
by pragmatic demands and these may be formalizable as well. The description
approach allows us to integrate theories from various levels and a syntactic the-
ory such as the Binding Theory, if adopted, has immediate relevance for the
construction of Discourse Representation Structures.
5.3 Presuppositions may get bound or be globally accommodated.
The approach to presuppositions that will follow is not in any sense new but
is given to show that some aspects of existing theories that seem exclusively
procedural may nonetheless receive a declarative treatment. We focus on def-
inite descriptions such as the man or that book, but the treatment in principle
applies equally to other presupposition triggers. We will follow (Heim, 1982) in
assuming that definites generally must either pick up a discourse referent that
is already present in their local context or must accommodate such a discourse
referent. Definite descriptions, in other words, are much like pronouns in this
respect. In (24a), where an elementary tree description for the definite the is
given, this aspect is captured by the requirement [σk | ] v Γk1 , which forces σk
to either unify with an existing discourse referent, or to be included in the uni-
verse of the background in a now familiar way. However, definite descriptions,
unlike pronouns, also carry descriptive material that is contributed by their
common nouns.18 This material, it is widely assumed, is of a presuppositional
character. We follow (Karttunen, 1974) in requiring that presuppositions must
be entailed by the local context of the point where they are triggered. In (24a)
this is mirrored in the requirement that Γk1 | σk2(σk).
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In (24b) the result of combining (24a) with a description of a common noun is
shown. Here the process of taking arbitrary witnesses has resulted in certain
instantiations for k, k1 and k2.
With an elementary tree description for the as in (24a), a text such as the
one in (25a) can be assumed to have been uttered in a context that does not
contain any reference to mules at all. The relevant local context for the mule
is given in (25b) and it is clear that, if σ6 is identified with u3, the required
entailment holds. This is a case where a presupposition is ‘caught’ or ‘bound’
by previous linguistic material. A case where presuppositional material must be
accommodated is given in (25c). Here the discourse referent, say σ2, must be
assumed to be already present in the background B and, since [ | wr: sun σ2]
must be entailed by B, the latter must also contain sufficient material for this
to be the case. A simple way for B to satisfy this requirement is if in fact
[ | wr : sun σ2] v B.
(25) a. Pedro has a mule. The mule is happy.
b. B ⊕ [wr o1 u3 | wr:Pedro o1, wr: o1 has u3, wr:mule u3]
c. The sun is shining brightly
d. If the weather turns out to be good, the king will be overjoyed
That the material that is in fact accommodated is not always the weakest DRS
such that the entailment requirement is met with is shown in (25d). Here
it would be sufficient to assume that the background contains, say, σ9, plus
a condition that can be paraphrased as ‘if the weather turns out good σ9 is
king’ (for local contexts involved in a conditional, see the Appendix). But
clearly this is not what is accommodated in ordinary contexts, where plain
‘σ9 is king’ is preferred. We agree with (Beaver, 2001) that accommodation,
while constrained by requirements that derive from properties of the linguistic
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system, is also a matter of common sense reasoning. The linguistic requirement
for a felicitous utterance of (25d) is that B entails ‘if the weather turns out
good σ9 is king’, but there are many ways in which this requirement can be
met, including the possibility that B contains ‘σ9 is king’. The present theory
underspecifies these possibilities. Common sense reasoning is needed to pick
out the most likely of them. While we have nothing to contribute to the theory
of common sense reasoning, we want to point out that from the perspective of
the present theory interaction and interdependency between linguistic reasoning
from input descriptions and other forms of human reasoning is to be expected.
The grammar is a reasoning mechanism and grammatical and other modes of
reasoning can easily interact.
(26) a. If John marries a woman, the unlucky female will be unhappy
b. B ⊕ [wr o1 u3 | wr: John o1, wr: o1 marries u3, wr:woman u3]
c. [ | wr: female u3, wr: unlucky u3]
d. [u9 | wr:woman u9]⇒ [ | wr: female u9]
e. [u9 | wr: o1 marries u9]⇒ [ | wr: unlucky u9]
In (25) we encountered some examples in which the material associated with a
definite description could either be unified completely with material already in
the linguistically generated part of the local context of that description or had
to be accommodated in its entirety. For good measure we also give an example
where some material (the discourse referent) is unified with existing material,
while other material must be presumed to be in the background. Consider
(26a). The local context of the unlucky female in this sentence is given in (26b)
and it is clear that its discourse referent can be taken to be equal with u3. If
this identification is made, (26c) must be entailed by (26b) and the common
sense reasoning component must abduce one or more plausible conditions such
that, if these conditions are assumed to be in B, the desired entailment holds.
Clearly, one condition that can easily be assumed to be in B is (26d), ‘women
are females’, and a more contentful assumption is (26e), ‘whoever is married by
John is unlucky’. If these assumptions are made, the required entailment holds.
5.4 Syntactic and semantic underspecification are inherent in the for-
malism.
In the previous sections we have seen that the formalism presented in this paper
essentially underspecifies linguistic structures. The description that is derived
from a given input may be compatible with the fact that the discourse referent
associated with a pronoun is identified with one previously mentioned referent
or with another. It may also be compatible with the accommodation of one
plausible condition that will cause entailment of a given elementary presupposi-
tion by its local context or with another. This underspecification is an essential
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feature of the formalism. Since descriptions are the vehicle for linguistic repre-
sentation and since descriptions may have more than one model, more than one
structure may correspond to a given input.
This underspecification is not restricted to anaphora and presuppositions
but is a property that pervades the grammar. In (27b) a description is shown
that can be derived from an input description for (27a) (see also (Muskens,
1995; Muskens, 2001)). The description underspecifies two scope possibilities,
one in which 7 = 10 and the existential outscopes the universal, and one in
which 16 = 10 and the scoping is reversed. It may be worthwile to note that the
upper part of this description is closely analogous to the relevant Underspecified
DRS in the theory of (Reyle, 1993).





























[u4 | wr :woman u4] ⊕ σ16
S−
16
In other words, the perspective chosen here automatically provides us with the
underspecification of structures that in standard DRT has to be added as an
extra. For examples of underspecification of syntactic structure, see (Muskens,
2001).
6 Conclusion
The descriptions perspective on syntax and semantics advocated in this paper
leads to a considerable change in the overall logical architecture of linguistic
theory. Nevertheless it remains compatible with most existing ideas in main-
stream linguistics and can even be argued to make for a smoother integration
of those existing ideas. The overall logical architecture is changed because the
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theory focuses on descriptions of linguistic objects (including meanings and the
form-meaning relation) rather than on those linguistic objects themselves; it also
describes the syntactic and semantic levels of the grammar in parallel and does
not follow the more common pipelined architecture in which syntactic forms
must be produced before interpretation can take place. Thus room is created
to account for an interdependency of syntax and semantics. On the other hand,
the view that language users represent language by means of descriptions rather
than by means of structures does not necessarily lead to any drastic revision
of our understanding of what these structures are. In this paper combinations
of standard Discourse Representation Structures and standard phrase structure
trees were taken to be the objects of description. The theory obviously is also
compatible with many other choices, but no radical departure from common
practice is needed or indeed desired in this respect.
That the architecture of the grammar may lead to a smooth integration
of existing theories may be illustrated using the example of the relation be-
tween antecedents and their dependents. Clearly, there are purely syntactic
constraints on this relation, such as those given by the Binding Theory or the
requirement that antecedents and dependents should concur in certain agree-
ment features. On the other hand, Discourse Representation Theory holds that
there are semantic, accessibility, constraints on the relation as well. Moreover,
it is clear that the set of possible antecedent-dependent resolutions is narrowed
down further by pragmatics. How are these constraints communicated between
the various levels of the grammar? On a purely structural view one level of
the grammar can only send structures to any other level, which means that a
constraint or set of constraints can only be communicated by sending exactly
those structures that satisfy the set of constraints. This leads to a filtering or
generate-and-test procedure: The grammar first gives indexes to all DPs in a
random way. Then for all resulting structures it is tested whether the Binding
Theory and other syntactic constraints are satisfied. Structures that pass the
tests are sent to the semantic component where further filtering is done, etc.
While such a generate-and-test perspective on grammatical processing may
be acceptable for certain logically possible grammars, its wastefulness makes it
unacceptable as a model of the real grammatical processing that takes place in
the mind. A theory of grammatical competence that holds that only linguistic
structures are involved in linguistic representation essentially predicts that the
grammar is unprocessable. This is because the number of structures that need
to be tested grows non-polynomically as a function of the length of the input.
Under such circumstances testing becomes undoable.
In contrast, on the descriptions account constraints are communicated di-
rectly between the various levels of the grammar. As an example of this we have
seen that adding axioms for the Binding Theory to our grammar G, or adding
the requirement in (20) (plus axioms for features) immediately narrows down
the range of structures that satisfy the theory and as a consequence may also
directly narrow down the range of Discourse Representation Structures that are
associated with a given input. A highly desired form of modularity results, for
it is possible to study syntactic and semantic constraints in their own right but
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it is also possible to combine them and to study their joint effects.
The view on linguistic processing advocated in this paper has been the fol-
lowing. Language users are in possession of a grammar G embodying their
linguistic knowledge. This grammar essentially is a theory about which lin-
guistic structures are possible. Language users are also in possession of general
reasoning faculties that are not linguistic in nature. Some reasoning is explicit
and concious, other reasoning may be implicit and subconcious. Upon being
confronted with a text T , the language user can form an input description IT of
that text and can start to reason about what was said (and what was meant) on
the basis of the conjunction of this description with G, perhaps in further con-
junction with extralinguistic knowledge. In general, the syntactic and semantic
constraints in G need not narrow down the range of structures satisfying IT to
a single one, a considerable degree of underspecification may remain and what
was said may not be completely determined.
Some of this underspecification may be of the ‘don’t care’ kind: the language
user may be able to draw all conclusions that he desires without further filling in
the details. But in many cases further specification is necessary and should come
from pragmatic considerations, general constraints on discourse, interpretational
constraints that are contributed by intonation, and so on. For an attempt to
make some of these further constraints explicit and an integrated treatment of
the resolution of anaphora and presupposition with the interpretation of focus
and felicity conditions on discourse contributions, see (van Leusen, 2003).
A Appendix: A Fragment of English in a Description Gram-
mar for Discourse
For further illustration we specify a tiny fragment of English in the format
of the description grammar proposed in the paper. For the lexemes of closed
word classes (sentence and discourse connectives, determiners, and pronouns)
we present the elementary and classifying descriptions in a single picture; for
the lexemes of open word classes (names, nouns, and verbs) we specify the ele-
mentary and classifying descriptions separately, picking one or two prototypical
lexemes to instantiate the classifying descriptions. The fragment covers sen-
tences and discourses such as ‘Pedro has a mule. He feeds it. He doesn’t beat
it.’; ‘If Pedro has a mule then he feeds it.’; ‘Pedro has a mule. Every man feeds
it.’; ‘Pedro beats the mule, or he feeds it’.
A.1 Elementary Descriptions for Some Closed Word Class Items
Let us start with giving elementary tree descriptions for the two discourse rela-
tions that were considered in this paper. The {S, T} notation in the description
of the sequencing relation abbreviates the disjunction `(k3) = s ∨ `(k3) = t.
This disjunction allows for a more general way of grouping as was allowed in






















Γk3 = Γk1 ⊕ σk2
A next series of descriptions are those for sentential connectives in (29). Note
that the description for or updates the local contexts of k2 and k3 in an asym-
metric way. This is one of the possibilities considered in (Karttunen, 1974). For
the other possibility, set Γk2 = Γk1 ⊕ [ |not σk3 ].
(29) a. S+
k1
[ |σk2 or σk3 ]
S−
k2














Γk3 = Γk1 ⊕ σk2
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Γk3 = Γk1 ⊕ σk2
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The determiners a, no and every receive descriptions in (30). Note that the
local context of k2 gets the same value in each case: the local context of the
mother S plus the restrictor.
(30) S+
k1
[uk | ] ⊕ σk4 (uk) ⊕ σk2
S−
k2
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The last two closed class descriptions are those for the definite determiner the






[σk | ] v Γk1








[σk | ] v Γk1
Dk
he
A.2 Lexical Descriptions for Open Word Class Items
The following descriptions exemplify classifying descriptions for proper names,
common nouns, intransitive and transitive verbs.
(32) a. ∀k [pedro(k)→ (pn(k) ∧ σπτk = λv [ |wr :Pedro v])]
b. ∀k [mary(k)→ (pn(k) ∧ σπτk = λv [ |wr :Mary v])]
c. ∀k [man(k)→ (cn(k) ∧ σπτk = λv [ |wr:man v])]
d. ∀k [mule(k)→ (cn(k) ∧ σπτk = λv [ |wr:mule v])]
e. ∀k [sleeps(k)→ (iv(k) ∧ σπτk = λv [ |wr: sleeps v])]
f. ∀k [dies(k)→ (iv(k) ∧ σπτk = λv [ |wr: dies v])]
g. ∀k[has(k)→ (tv(k) ∧ σπ(πτ)(k) = λv′λv [ | wr : v has v
′])]
h. ∀k[feeds(k)→ (tv(k) ∧ σπ(πτ)(k) = λv′λv [ | wr : v feeds v
′])]
The treatment of proper names is slightly different from the one in (7d) inthe
main text. Most semantic information has been taken out of the classifying
description and has been moved to the elementary tree description in (33) below.
That part of the information that is different for each name is communicated
using a πτ predicate term.
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